Since Russia’s invasion of Ukraine began in February, Europe has supported Kyiv at considerable cost to itself. Economic challenges are feeding social divisions, with huge anti-western protests in Prague at the start of September proving that backing Ukraine to the hilt remains no easy task.
Yet recent Ukrainian advances suggest that, as well as being a moral necessity, western support may also end up being vindicated as a practical success. And even if a Ukrainian victory remains uncertain for now, it’s important to consider how Europe would respond to such an eventuality. In particular, the West needs to ask itself how it would treat Russia in the aftermath of a defeat for Putin.
In her State of the Union address to the European Parliament on Wednesday, European Commission president Ursula von der Leyen promised that “sanctions are here to stay,” calling them “the price for Putin’s trail of death and destruction.” Indeed, the Ukraine war has already brought about a transformation of the EU’s energy sector, ending an era of Russian dominance.
But the question must be asked: what conditions would be required for the resumption of some form of economic cooperation with Russia? Do such conditions even exist?
Clearly, the West should not re-open economic ties with Putin simply because he was unable to pull off his imperialist ambitions. A consensus therefore seems likely that sanctions should stay in place for as long as the Putin regime lasts – even if he were to fully relinquish his claims on Ukraine.
On the other hand, while lifting sanctions would be morally unjustifiable as long as Putin remains in power, it is also possible that continuing a full sanctions programme after Russia’s defeat would remove obstacles to further Russian aggression and entrench nationalist narratives of grievance. It has always been a strategic drawback of sanctions that once triggered, they no longer work as political leverage.
A related headache would face Eastern Europe, in particular, in the event of a Ukrainian victory. Countries in this region have imposed severe restrictions on the entry of ordinary Russians, and call on the EU as a whole to follow suit.
But the policy has been rejected by other European states – with good reason. Apart from questions about the moral rectitude of punishing civilians for Putin’s actions, it’s also unclear under what conditions these travel bans will ever be lifted. Would any ceasefire approved by Ukraine be sufficient to absolve Russians’ collective guilt for the war? Would a total Ukrainian victory be required, even though ordinary Russians would have done nothing to bring this about? Or are Russians first expected to show agency and prove their moral fibre by overthrowing Putin and bringing about a wholesale change in their nation’s foreign policy?
Such questions must be asked because unlike in the wars of the twentieth century, there is little prospect of Ukraine and the West being able to impose conditions on an entirely defeated and desperate foe, in so doing paving the way for a new era of relations. The goal of the Ukrainian war effort is to drive Russian troops out of the country and keep them out; not to dominate the Russian state in turn. A corollary of this is that unless Putin were to be replaced by a particularly generous pro-Ukrainian and pro-western leader, reparations for the enormous damage inflicted on Ukraine will also be off the table.
In pondering how it would respond to Ukrainian victory, Europe must contend with the possibility of a future Russia with or without Putin as leader. How Russia would be treated depends on developments over which the West will have little influence – but for which it must, nonetheless, be prepared. Without a major change in Russia’s politics, even total victory for Ukraine cannot be the justification for a reset in relations.
